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Abstract
Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by
allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing
platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit
sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of
a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation
level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider
using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking
into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a
crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate
traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions
for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical
scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze
the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure
information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian
Stackelberg equilibrium is validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users.
Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile
participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social
structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, we have been witnessing a fast proliferation of mobile users and devices
in daily life. The ubiquitous mobile devices with various embedded functional sensors have
remarkably promoted the information generation process. These advances stimulate the rapid
development of mobile sensing technologies, and mobile crowdsensing becomes one of the
most attractive and popular paradigms. Mobile crowdsensing leverage the sensing capacity of
worldwide available smart phones, e.g., GPS, camera and digital compass, to collect distributed
sensory data.
The basic crowdsensing platform typically includes a cloud-based system and a collection of
smart phones or mobile users. The platform can post a set of sensing tasks with different purposes,
and mobile users are actively involved to perform the corresponding tasks. Realizing the great
business potential, lots of crowdsensing-based applications have been designed and introduced
in a number of areas. Sensorly [1] is dedicated for WiFi coverage information, Waze [2] and
GreenGPS [3] are to collect road traffic information, DietSensor [4] is proposed to share and
track the diet nutrition, and Noisetube [5] is for monitoring the noise pollution.
Nevertheless, voluntary participation in the crowdsensing platform may not be sustainable.
This is from the fact that the mobile users need to spend their own resources, e.g., smart phone
battery, CPU computing power, storage memory, to accomplish the sensing tasks. Another major
concern that discourages the mobile users from participation comes from the potential privacy
issues. Therefore, individuals are reluctant to participate and share their collected information
due to the lack of sufficient motivation and incentive. Nevertheless, the crowdsensing systems
heavily rely on total user participation level and the individual contribution from each user. To
stimulate and recruit users with mobile devices to participate in crowdsensing, the crowdsensing
platform administrator, i.e., the Crowdsensing Service Provider (CSP), usually provides a reward
for mobile users as a monetary incentive to compensate their cost or risk.
It is challenging to design the incentive mechanism that achieves a sustainable and profitable
market for the CSP. When the reward is small, the collected sensing information from mobile
participants is insufficient. Conversely, when the reward is large, the CSP may incur excessive
operation cost. Accordingly, an efficient incentive mechanism has become an emerging topic of
interest for a large number of researchers. However, most of the existing works have addressed the
incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing without considering the interdependent behaviors
3of mobile users from social domain. This interdependency originates from the network effects.
Traditionally, network effects refer to the phenomenon that public goods or service is more
valuable if it is adopted by more users. In crowdsensing service, the participation behavior of
mobile users can be deemed as buying “public goods”, which means that the mobile users are
more willing to participate if the number of other users is greater. For example, in a crowdsensing-
based road traffic information sharing application, a user can receive a better and accurate
traffic report if more users join and share their road information. Consequently, the complex and
interdependent user behaviors post a remarkable challenge to the operation of the crowdsensing
platform. More importantly, the network effects frequently exist in densely connected social
relationships, which is one of the key criteria to promote the wisdom of crowds [6], [7].
Nevertheless, only a few works [8], [9] have studied the incentive mechanism for crowdsensing
and exploited the network effects at the same time. The authors in [8], [9] investigated the
behaviors of mobile users under the global network effects1, which is not appropriate for the
structure of an underlying social domain. By contrast, social (local) network effects refer to
the case where each user is only influenced directly by the decisions of other densely socially-
connected users [11], [12]. For example, in a mobile crowdsensing platform for sharing road
traffic information, a user (driver) can get a better route if more neighbourhood users (users
in the same or nearby road) of this user join and contribute their traffic data [2], [3]. On the
contrary, this user cannot obtain any benefits if the users in other distant roads join and share
their traffic data. This fact motivates us to explore the role of social (local) network effects in
designing the incentive mechanism of crowdsensing service.
In this paper, we propose novel incentive mechanisms by leveraging the underlying social
network effects to attract participants to crowdsensing platform. First, the crowdsensing platform
administrator, i.e., the CSP, determines the incentive, i.e., the offered reward, to maximize
its revenue. Then, based on the given reward, the mobile users decide on their participation
level individually by taking the social network effects into account. The above rewarding and
participating decision marking process can be inherently modeled as a hierarchical Stackelberg
game. Moreover, we consider the uncertainty of social network effects, which is commonly
applicable to some of the real-world crowdsensing applications. As such, we also formulate the
1Global network effects refer to as the phenomenon that a user will obtain higher value when its behavior aligns with any
other users [10].
4Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze and evaluate the impacts of
uncertainty of social network effects. The major contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• To our best knowledge, this is the first work on designing incentive mechanisms for mobile
crowdsensing with the consideration of complete and incomplete information on social
network effects. In particular, we exploit the social network effects in the game model, which
utilizes the structural properties from the underlying social domain, and fully characterizes
the social relations among the mobile users.
• We model the interaction between the CSP and mobile users as a two-stage Stackelberg
game and analyze each stage systematically through backward induction. We investigate two
types of incentive mechanism for the crowdsensing platform with complete and incomplete
information on social network effects, i.e., the Stackelberg game based incentive mechanism
and the Bayesian Stackelberg game based incentive mechanism, respectively.
• In the Stackelberg game based incentive mechanism, the CSP and mobile users acquire the
exact information on underlying social network effects. We propose the optimal incentive
mechanism in terms of discriminatory incentive and uniform incentive, in which the CSP
offers the different or the same reward to all the mobile users. For both, we are able to
obtain the analytical expression for optimal reward.
• In the Bayesian Stackelberg game based incentive mechanism, the specific information on
social network effects is under uncertainty. We obtain a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
adopted by the mobile users in closed-form. Thereafter, the existence and uniqueness of
the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium is proved by identifying the best response strategies
of the mobile users.
• Performance evaluation is provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game
theory based socially-aware incentive mechanisms. Numerical results show that the network
effects play an important role to promote higher participation level and thus greatly improve
the revenue of the CSP. Moreover, the information about social relationship, i.e., social
structure, helps the CSP to achieve greater revenue gain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the literature review.
Section III describes the system model and the game formulation. In Section IV, we analyze
the mobile user participation level and optimal reward using backward induction. In Section V,
5we formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game where the social structure information is uncertain,
and study the Bayesian game equilibrium. Section VI presents the performance evaluation and
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Recently, a large number of prior works have been dedicated to designing incentive mecha-
nisms [13]. Auction is a widely-adopted method to design the incentive mechanisms. In [14], the
authors presented a mechanism for participation level determination and reward allocation using
optimal reverse auction, in which the CSP receives service queries and initiates an auction for
user participation. The authors in [15] explored the truthful mechanism with strong requirements
of data integrity where the tasks are time window dependent. A reverse auction framework is
adopted to derive the optimal incentive, which is computationally efficient and individually
rational. In [16], the authors investigated scheduling problem, where the CSP announces a set
of tasks and then mobile users compete for the tasks based on the sensing costs and available
time periods. The approximation mechanisms for the CSP to schedule and reward the users
under certain budget is provided. The authors in [17] studied incentivizing user participation
and assigning location dependent tasks with capacity budget. A truthful one-round auction with
approximation algorithm is proposed to obtain the optimal reward offered to the participants.
In [18], the authors considered the user-centric model where each user can ask for reserve
price, and designed the truthful and scalable auction mechanism for the CSP to achieve revenue
maximization. The authors in [19] addressed how to maximize the valuation of the covered
interested regions under limited budget for strategy-proof mobile crowdsensing. In [20], the
authors proposed a long-term dynamic incentive mechanism to capture the dynamic nature
of long-term data quality of participants, where a truthful, quality-aware and budget feasible
algorithm is designed for task allocation with polynomial-time computational complexity. The
authors in [21] investigated the auction based incentive mechanism considering social cost
minimization and privacy preservation. The participants are selected based on predefined score
functions by the CSP, and the computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness and
differential privacy are guaranteed. To prevent the Sybil attack where a user illicitly disguises
other identities to obtain benefits, the authors in [22] designed Sybil-proof auction-based incentive
mechanisms.
6In addition to auction mechanism design, the incentive mechanisms are examined with different
objectives. For example, the authors in [23] considered that the sensing information has an
attached time-sensitive value that decreases over time and focused on the incentive design for
cooperative data collection of participants. In [7], the authors explored the incentive mechanism
with multiple CSPs, where the incentive mechanism is modeled as a noncooperative game. The
discrete time dynamic inspired by the best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the Nash
equilibrium of the modeled game. The authors in [24] presented a novel Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
game based incentive mechanism for sensing resource sharing by the encouraged participants.
The task allocation and resource sharing algorithm is developed to achieve the social fairness and
efficiency tradeoff. The authors developed a new framework called Steered Crowdsensing in [25],
which controls incentives by introducing gamifications with monetary reward to location-based
services. In [26], the authors incorporated the consideration of data quality into the mechanism,
and rewarded the participant depending on the quality of its collected data. The authors in [27]
applied Tullock contests to design incentive mechanisms, where the reward includes a fixed
contest prize, and Tullock prize function depending on the winner’s contribution. In [28], the
authors proposed a reward-based collaboration mechanism, where the CSP announces a total
reward to be shared among collaborators, and the task and reward are allocated if sufficient
number of participants are willing to collaborate. In [29], the authors studied a quality-aware
Bayesian incentive problem for robust crowdsensing, where the data quality and sensing cost of
users are drawn from known distribution.
In [30], the authors considered a sealed market for the CSP, where the participants have
imperfect information on other participants behavior. The iterative game framework is introduced
and the incentive mechanism is obtained by best response dynamics with several iterations. The
authors in [31] formulated the one-to-many Nash bargaining game to model the interaction
between the CSP and participants. The distributed algorithm that ensures the participators’
privacy and reduces the computation load of the CSP is provided. The authors in [32] proposed
blockchain based distributed incentive mechanism which can remove the security threats caused
by a “trustful” crowdsensing center. The participants with sensing information contribution obtain
the reward that is recorded in transaction blocks. In our previous work [33], we considered
the social network effects that promote the participation level while designing the incentive
mechanism. In [34], the authors also pointed out the importance of “network effects” on social
information sharing with the problem of dynamic routing. For example, a user traveling on
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Figure 1: Basic system model of mobile crowdsensing platform with social network effects.
one route benefits from the content collected by users traveling on another route. However, the
scenario where the network effects is certain has its limitation which may not be applicable
to some of the real-world applications such as crowdsensing. In this paper, we consider the
uncertain scenario where the social structure information is not known exactly by the CSP and
participants.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND GAME FORMULATION
We model the interaction among the Crowdsensing Service Provider (CSP) and the socially-
aware participants, i.e., Mobile Users (MUs), as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, where the
action of each MU is to choose an individual participation level and the action of the CSP is to
give the payment as a reward to incentivize the MUs (Fig. 1). Consider a set of MUs denoted by
N ∆= {1, . . . , N}. Each MU i ∈ N determines its participation level or effort level, e.g., sensing
data transmission frequency or sensing resolution, denoted by xi where xi ∈ (0,+∞).
Let x ∆= (x1, . . . , xN) and x−i denote the participation levels of all the MUs and all other
MUs except MU i, respectively. The reward per effort unit provided to the MUs is given as:
r = [r1, . . . ri, . . . , rN ]
>. Then, the utility of MU i is given by
ui(xi,x−i) = fi(xi) + Φ(xi,x−i) + r(xi)− c(xi). (1)
The first term fi(x) represents the private utility or internal effects that MU i obtains from the
participation, which can be formulated as fi(xi) = aixi − bixi2, where ai > 0 and bi > 0 are
the coefficients that capture the intrinsic value of the participation to different MUs with hetero-
geneity [11], [12]. For example, in a crowdsensing-based traffic information sharing application,
8Table I: Main Notations
Symbol Definition
N , N Set of MUs, and the total number of MUs, respectively
Ni Set of social neighbours of MU i
xi Participation level of MU i, i.e., the effort level in participation
x, x−i The participation levels of all the MUs and all other MUs except MU i, respectively
ri The offered reward to MU i from the CSP
ai, bi The coefficients capturing the intrinsic value of different MUs
gij The influence of MU j on MU i
c The MU’s unit cost associated to its participation level
µ The parameter representing the equivalent monetary worth of MUs’ participation level
s, t The coefficients capturing the concavity of the profit obtained from the total contribution of all MUs
ui The utility of MU i
Π The revenue of the CSP
γ Given social network effects coefficient
k The out-degree of MU
l The in-degree of MU
P (k) The out-degree distribution of MUs
H(l) The in-degree distribution of MUs
Avg(x−i) The average participation level of social neighbours of MU i
k¯ Average level of social network effects
σ2k, σ
2
l The two variance of out-degree and in-degree distributions
when a user reports speed and location on a certain road more frequently, i.e., larger xi, the
accuracy of the traffic condition on that road is higher [2], [3]. As in [11], the quadratic form of
the internal utility not only allows for tractable analysis, but also serves as a good second-order
approximation for a broad class of concave utility functions. Additionally, the linear-quadratic
function captures the decreasing marginal returns from participation. In particular, ai models the
maximum internal participation willingness rate, and bi models such willingness elasticity factor.
The second term, Φ(xi,x−i) denotes the external benefits gained from the network effects,
which is the key component from Eq. (1). In crowdsensing applications, an MU can enjoy an
additional benefit from information contributed or shared by the others [10]. The existing work
explored the network effects of global nature, where the additional benefits due to new coming
MUs are the same for all the existing MUs [8]. However, due to the structural properties from
the underlying social domain, it is more appropriate to consider the network effects locally in
9crowdsensing service, i.e., the social network effects. Then, we introduce the adjacency matrix
G = [gij]i,j∈N . The elements in matrix gij indicates the influence of MU j on MU i, which can
be unidirectional or bidirectional. For example, with a larger gij , the participation level of MU
j can increase the utility of MU i faster. Motivated by the idea of social reciprocity [35], [36],
a user’s social behavior to another is likely to imitate and be imitated by the latter’s behavior to
the former. As a result, two MU social ties to each other tend to be the same. Thus, we consider
gij = gji in this paper, i.e., the social tie is reciprocal. Nevertheless, the proposed model can be
applied to asymmetric social ties straightforwardly (Please refer to Appendix C). Specifically,
we adopt
∑
j∈N gijxixj to represent the additional benefits obtained from the network effects,
similar to that in [11], [12], [37].
The third term, r(xi), is the reward from CSP to the MU i, which is equal to rixi , i.e.,
the reward is a linear function to the effort or participation level. The last term c(xi) denotes
the cost associated to the participation level of the MU, e.g., energy consumption and network
bandwidth consumed. Similar to [8], we assume that the cost is equal to cxi, where c is the
MU’s unit cost.2 Then the utility of MU i is expressed by:
ui(xi,x−i, r) = aixi − bixi2 +
N∑
j=1
gijxixj + rixi − cxi. (2)
The monopoly CSP operates and maintains the platform with a fixed cost, which is ignored
for the simplicity of the analysis later. Then, the formulation of revenue for the CSP is given by
the payoff from total aggregated contribution of all MUs minus the total reward paid to MUs,
i.e.,
Π = µ
N∑
i=1
(sxi − txi2)−
N∑
i=1
rixi. (3)
Similar to [12], we also use the linear-quadratic function for tractability to transform the MUs’
participation level into the monetary revenue of the CSP, which features the law of diminishing
return. That is, an MU’s contribution increases with the MU’s effort level but the marginal
return decreases. µ is an adjustable parameter representing the equivalent monetary worth of
MUs’ participation level, and s, t > 0 are coefficients capturing the concavity of the function.
2 It is noted that, the same approach can also be applied to the model with heterogeneous unit cost (like cixi2) straightforwardly
(Please refer to Appendix D).
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We first address the incentive mechanism by modeling the strategic interactions between the
CSP and the MUs as a two-stage single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game.
Definition 1. Two-stage reward-participation game:
• Stage I (Reward): The CSP determines the reward, aiming at the highest revenue, i.e.,
r∗ = arg max
r
{
µ
N∑
i=1
(sxi − txi2)−
N∑
i=1
rixi
}
;
• Stage II (Participation): Each MU i ∈ N chooses the participation level xi, given the
observed reward r and the participation levels of other MUs x−i, with the goal to maximize
its individual utility, i.e.,
x∗i = arg max
xi
ui(xi,x−i, r).
We solve this two-stage Stackelberg game by finding a subgame perfect equilibrium for the
cases of discriminatory incentive mechanism and uniform incentive mechanism for all MUs.
IV. STACKELBERG GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
A. Stage II: MUs’ participation equilibrium
Based on the definition of the Nash equilibrium, each MU chooses its participation level that is
the best response. By setting the first-order derivative ∂ui(xi,x−i)
∂xi
to 0, we obtain the best response
of MU i as follows:
x∗i = max
{
0,
ri − c+ ai
2bi
+
N∑
j=1
gij
2bi
xj
}
,∀i. (4)
Each MU’s best response includes two parts. ri−c+ai
2bi
is independent from the strategies of the
other MUs, and
N∑
j=1
gij
2bi
xj is dependent on the other MUs’ participation levels due to underlying
social network effects. Although the participation level strategy of each MU is obtained as in
Eq. (4), the Nash equilibrium cannot be ensured to be unique or even exist since each MU
may unboundedly increase its participation level if the other MUs’ participation levels are large
enough. Therefore, we present a sufficient assumption, under which there exists the unique Nash
equilibrium as described in Theorem 1. Regarding the assumption, the MU has the upper bound
on participation level, e.g., due to the battery capacity of a mobile device, and thus Assumption 1
is reasonable.
Assumption 1.
N∑
j=1
gij
2bi
< 1,∀i.
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Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, the existence and uniqueness of MU participation equilibrium,
i.e., the Nash equilibrium of Stage II in this Stackelberg game, can be guaranteed.
Proof. Existence of MU participation equilibrium: We denote x∗ as the strategy profile in
the MU participation sub-game, and x†i as the largest participation level in x
∗. Then, we have
x†i =
(
ri − c+ ai
2bi
+
N∑
j=1
gij
2bi
xj
)+
≤ ri − c+ ai
2bi
+
N∑
j=1
x†i
gij
2bi
≤ |ri − c+ ai|
2bi
+
N∑
j=1
x†i
|gij|
2bi
.
Thus, under Assumption 1, we have
x†i ≤
|ri − c+ ai|
2bi −
N∑
j=1
|gij|
= x̂.
As a result, the strategy space [0, x̂] is convex and compact, and the utility function ui(xi,x−i) is
continuous in xi and x−i. We also have the second-order derivative of MU’s objective function
as follows:
∂2ui
∂2xi
= −2bi < 0.
Thus, the MU participation sub-game is a concave game which always admits the Nash equi-
librium.
Uniqueness of MU participation equilibrium: Firstly, we have
−∂
2ui
∂xi2
= −(−2bi + gii) = 2bi.
Then, based on Assumption 1, we have
−∂
2ui
∂xi2
>
N∑
j=1
gij =
N∑
j=1
|gij| =
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣− ∂2ui∂xixj
∣∣∣∣, (5)
which satisfies the dominance solvability condition, i.e., Moulin’s Theorem [38]. As a result,
the uniqueness of MU participation equilibrium is guaranteed under Assumption 1. The proof
is then completed.
Then, we propose the best response dynamics algorithm to obtain the Nash equilibrium with
respect to MUs’ participation level, as shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm iteratively updates
the MUs’ strategies based on their best response functions in Eq. (4), and converges to the Nash
equilibrium of MU participation sub-game.
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 achieves the Nash equilibrium of MU participation sub-game.
12
Algorithm 1 Simultaneous best-response updating for finding Nash equilibrium of MU partici-
pation sub-game
1: Input:
Precision threshold , x[0]i ← 0, x[1]i ← 1 + , k ← 1;
2: while
∥∥∥x[k]i − x[k−1]i ∥∥∥
1
>  do
3: for all i ∈ N do
4: x[k+1]i =
(
ri−c+ai
2bi
+
N∑
j=1
x
[k]
j
gij
2bi
)+
;
5: end for
6: k ← k + 1;
7: end while
8: Return x[k]i ;
Note that Algorithm 1 achieves the approximate Nash equilibrium of MU participation sub-
game, and the approximate accuracy, which measured by the gap between the achieved results
and the optimal Nash equilibrium, depends on the precision threshold . The convergence speed
of the proposed algorithm also depends on precision threshold . When  is small, the number
of iterations needed is large but the achieved results are more accurate. Conversely, when  is
big, the number of iterations needed is small but the achieved results are less accurate.
For ease of presentation, we have the following definitions, B := diag(2b1, 2b2, . . . , 2bN),
a := [ai]N×1, 1 := [1]N×1, G := [gij]N×N , r := [ri]N×1 and I is an N ×N identity matrix. For
the rest of the paper, similar to [12], [39], we consider the practical situation where all the MUs
have positive participation levels at the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., a special case of Eq. (4).
Then, with Lemma 1, we can rewrite Eq. (4) in a matrix form as follows:
x = K (a+ r− c1) , (6)
where K = (B−G)−1.
Lemma 1. B−G is positive definite matrix, which is invertible.
Proof. We first denote (B−G)ij as the value in the ith row and the jth column of the matrix
B−G, and it holds that (B−G)ii = 2bi − gii = 2bi since we have gii = 0. Under Assump-
tion 1, we also have 2bi >
N∑
j=1
gij . Furthermore, we observe that
N∑
j=1
gij = −
∑
j 6=i
(B−G)ij =∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣(B−G)ij∣∣∣. Therefore, it holds that (B−G)ii = 2bi >∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣(B−G)ij∣∣∣.
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Accordingly, B−G is strictly diagonally dominant and all the diagonal elements, i.e., 2bi are
larger than 0. Based on Gershgorin circle theorem [40], every eigenvalue λ of B−G satisfies
|(B−G)ii − λ| <
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣(B−G)ij∣∣∣. (7)
Moreover, we know λ > 0, and thus B−G is a positive definite matrix, from which its
invertibility follows. The proof is then completed.
B. Stage I: Optimal incentive mechanism
In this stage, the monopoly CSP determines the reward to be paid to the MUs, the objective of
which is to maximize the CSP’s revenue. Specifically, we investigate the discriminatory incentive
mechanism and the uniform incentive mechanism, respectively. The significance of each incentive
mechanism is as follows. Under the uniform incentive mechanism, the equilibrium ensures a fair
reward applied to all MUs. Moreover, the uniform incentive mechanism is simple to implement
in the crowdsensing applications. However, the CSP has limited degree of freedom to maximize
its profit. By contrast, under the discriminatory incentive mechanism, the CSP can customize
the reward for each MU, matching with the MU’s preference and capability. As such, the profit
obtained under the discriminatory incentive mechanism is expected to be superior to that of the
uniform incentive mechanism. This is also confirmed in our numerical results.
1) Discriminatory incentive mechanism: Under reward discrimination, the CSP is able to
provide different reward for different MUs as incentive to maximize its revenue. The revenue
maximization problem can be formulated as follows:
maximize
r
Π = µ
N∑
i=1
(sxi − txi2)−
N∑
i=1
rixi
= µ(s1>x− x>tx)− r>x.
subject to x = K (a+ r− c1) .
(8)
By plugging x into the objective function in Eq. (8), we have
Π = µ
(
s1>K (a+ r− c1)− t(a+ r− c1)>K2 (a+ r− c1)
)
− r>K (a+ r− c1) . (9)
Taking the partial derivative of the objective function in Eq. (8) with respect to the decision
vector r to zero, i.e., ∂Π
∂r
= 0, we obtain
µ
(
sK1− 2tK2 (a+ r− c1))−K (a+ r− c1)−Kr = 0. (10)
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Then, we have
µ
(
sK1− 2tK2 (a− c1))−K (a− c1) = (2K+ 2µtK2) r. (11)
Finally, we obtain the optimal value r∗, which is represented as follows:
r∗ = (2I+ 2µtK)−1 (µ (s1− 2tK (a− c1))− (a− c1)) . (12)
2) Uniform incentive mechanism: In this case, the CSP can only choose a single uniform reward
to be paid to all the MUs, i.e., ri = r, for all i. Then, the optimization problem is given by
maximize
r
Π = µ
N∑
i=1
(sxi − txi2)− r
N∑
i=1
xi
= µ(s1>x− x>tx)− r1>x.
subject to x = K [a+ (r − c)1] .
(13)
Similarly, we eliminate x from the objective function in Eq. (13), and we obtain
Π = µ
(
s1>K (a+ (r − c)1)− t(a+ (r − c)1)>K2 (a+ (r − c)1)
)
− r1>K (a+ (r − c)1) .
(14)
Then, we evaluate its first-order optimality condition with respect to the reward r, which yields
∂Π
∂r
= µ
(
s1>K1− 2t(a+ (r − c)1)>K21
)
− 1>K (a+ (r − c)1)− r1>K1 = 0. (15)
As a result, with simple steps, we obtain the optimal value of the uniform reward, which is
represented by
r∗ =
(
2µt1>K21+ 21>K1
)−1 (
µ
(
s1>K1− 2t(a− c1)>K21)− 1>K (a− c1)) . (16)
Until now, we have obtained the optimal incentive mechanism in terms of uniform reward and
discriminatory reward in closed-form solution with complete information, and hence validated
the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
V. BAYESIAN STACKELBERG GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR SOCIALLY-AWARE
INCENTIVE MECHANISM WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Recall from Section IV, we assume that the MUs will truthfully report their personal in-
formation (type) to the CSP. This situation can happen when there exists a supervising entity
in the market that is capable of monitoring, sharing and storing all behaviors to ensure that
the MUs always report the correct information. However, without a supervising entity which is
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often the case in practice, the MU does not reveal private information (type) to the CSP because
of the concern on privacy leakage or selfish behaviors. Therefore, the incomplete information
scenario is more applicable to the real-world crowdsensing applications and address the incentive
mechanism therein. In this section, we extend the analysis to the scenario where the social
structure information (the social network effects) is not exactly known by the CSP and MUs.
Thus, we formulate the incentive mechanism as a Bayesian Stackelberg game [41], [42], and
evaluate the game equilibrium by defining and optimizing the expected utility of MUs and the
expected revenue of the CSP.
A. Problem formulation with social structure uncertainty
In the model proposed in Section III, the important social structure information may be
uncertain or unknown by the decision makers, i.e., the CSP and MUs. Accordingly, this game
can be modeled as a Bayesian game where the Bayesian analysis is adopted to predict the
game outcome. In particular, the social relationship, i.e., social structure of each MU is private
information and is considered as the type of the followers. Only its probability distribution
is commonly known. Such distribution information can be obtained through, e.g., historical
information or long-term learning.
The mobile social structure is represented by an interaction matrix, i.e., the adjacency matrix
G. As aforementioned, the element gij denotes the strength of the influence of MU j on MU i.
Recall from Section III, the utility of an MU can be expressed as follows:
ui(xi,x−i, r) = xi − 1
2
xi
2 +
N∑
j=1
gijxixj + rixi − cxi. (17)
Note that we set ai = 1 and bi = 1/2 in order to concentrate on the social structure uncertainty.
Moreover, without loss of generality, for all the social neighbours of MU i, i.e., j ∈ Ni, gij =
γ > 0, and γ is a given social network effect coefficient. Thus, the above equation is rewritten
as follows:
ui(xi,x−i, r) = xi − 1
2
xi
2 + γxi
∑
j∈Ni
xj + rixi − cxi. (18)
Therefore, the expected utility is expressed as follows:
Ui(xi,x−i, r) = E [ui(xi,x−i, r)] = xi − 1
2
xi
2 + γxiE
[∑
j∈Ni
xj
]
+ rixi − cxi. (19)
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The social structure leads to different in-degrees and out-degrees of MUs. The in-degree
denotes the number of other MUs that a certain MU influences, the out-degree denotes the
number of other MUs influencing this MU. Thus, the in-degree represents its influence and the
out-degree represents its susceptibility. The distribution3 of in-degree and out-degree captures
the social network effects from the network interaction patterns [11], [43]–[46]. Note that the
proposed model can still be applied to the asymmetric social ties, since we consider both the in-
degree and out-degree distributions of each MU instead of the degree distribution. For example,
an MU Alice has the social influence on another MU, but the latter may not have the social
influence on Alice. The reason is that Alice may have different in-degree and out-degree.
The in-degree l ∈ D and out-degree k ∈ D, where D = {0, 1, . . . , kmax} and kmax denotes
the maximum possible value. We define P : D → [0, 1] and H : D → [0, 1] as the probability
distributions of out-degree and in-degree, respectively, and we have
∑
k∈D
P (k) =
∑
l∈D
H(l) = 1.
Furthermore, we assume that two probability distributions are independent and their variances
are denoted as σk2 and σl2, respectively. Due to consistency theory, we know
∑
k∈D
P (k)k =∑
l∈D
H(l)l = k, and thus k is referred to as the mean value of social network effects. Moreover,
we have
E
[∑
j∈Ni
xj
]
= ki × Avg(x−i), (20)
where Avg(x−i) = E [xj |j ∈ Ni ] denotes the average participation level of social neighbours of
MU i.
In order to obtain the expression of Avg(x−i), we employ the concept of “Configuration
Model” in Network Science [47] to model the random networks generated with only in-degree
distribution. According to Configuration Model’s property (See Chapter 12.2 in [47]), to a user,
the degree distribution of its randomly chosen neighbor is H(l) = H(l)l∑
l′∈D
H(l′)l′ . In other words, a
randomly selected social neighbours of MU i has the in-degree distribution as H(l) and out-
3Since the social ties/links are constructed by the in/out-degree information of MUs, the social ties/links are also treated as
random variables in some sense. Note that γ in the model is a given social network effect coefficient, which captures the strength
of social ties/links. Although the value of γ is given, the social ties/links follow certain probability distribution instead of being
the constant value. It is also noteworthy that γ can be treated as an approximate term instead of the accurate value. Nevertheless,
the impacts of uncertainty of γ can still be absorbed into the distribution of in/out-degree since they are interdependent.
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degree distribution as P (k). Thus, by denoting the participation level of the MU with out-degree
k and in-degree l as x(k, l), we have [45], [46]
Avg(x−i) =
∑
l∈D
H¯(l)
(∑
k∈D
P (k)x(k, l)
)
, (21)
where H(l) = H(l)l∑
l′∈D
H(l′)l′ . Note that given Avg(x−i), the participation level of MU i only depends
on the reward and its out-degree k. Thus, the final expected utility of MU i is expressed as
follows:
Ui(xi,x−i, r, ki) = (1 + ri − c)xi − 1
2
xi
2 + γkixiAvg(x−i), (22)
and the type of the MU is its in-degree and out-degree, which is denoted as (l, k).
Since only the distribution of the in-degree and out-degree information is known, instead of
maximizing the revenue as defined in Eq. (3), the objective of the leader, i.e., the CSP, is to
maximize its expected revenue, which is given as follows:
Π =
∑
l∈D
(∑
k∈D
H(l)P (k)
(
(µs− r(k, l))x(k, l)− µt(x(k, l))2)), (23)
where r(k, l) is the reward offered to the MU with out-degree k and in-degree l.
B. Stackelberg game equilibrium analysis
We also adopt the backward induction to analyze the Bayesian Stackelberg game.
1) Follower game: For the given incentive or the reward determined by the CSP, we examine
the Bayesain Nash equilibrium in the follower game which is characterized by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the follower
game can be guaranteed, provided that the following condition
γkmax < 1 (24)
holds.
Proof. The existence of Bayesain follower game: To prove that there exists at least one Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in the follower game (Proposition 1 in [48]), we need to ensure that the
following condition
∂Ui(x,x−i, r, ki)
∂xi
≤ 0,∀i ∈ N , k ∈ Z+, r ∈ R+,∃x ≥ 0, ∀x ≤ x (25)
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holds, where x = Avg(x−i). Since we have
∂Ui(x¯,x−i, r, ki)
∂xi
= (1 + ri − c)− x¯+ γkiAvg(x−i)
≤ (1 + ri − c)− x¯+ γkmaxx¯
= 1 + ri − c+ (γkmax − 1)x¯, (26)
we can ensure that the condition in Eq. (25) holds provided that γkmax < 1 is satisfied.
The uniqueness of Bayesain follower game: The proof of the uniqueness of the pure Bayesian
Nash equilibrium can be directly derived from [48]. In particular, the sufficient condition that
implies there exists at most one Bayesian Nash equilibrium is given as follows (Proposition 3
in [48]): ∣∣∣∣∂2Ui(x¯,x−i, r, ki)∂xi∂Avg(x−i)
/
∂2Ui(x¯,x−i, r, ki)
∂xi∂xi
∣∣∣∣ < 1,∀i ∈ N . (27)
With simple steps, we have
∣∣∣∂2Ui(x¯,x−i,r,ki)∂xi∂Avg(x−i) /∂2Ui(x¯,x−i,r,ki)∂xi∂xi ∣∣∣ = |γki| ≤ |γkmax|. Thus, if γkmax < 1
holds, the condition given in Eq. (27) is guaranteed. The proof is then completed.
To obtain the closed-form expression of the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium point in the
follower game, we first apply partial derivative of the expected utility given in Eq. (22), i.e.,
∂Ui(x¯,x−i,r,ki)
∂xi
= 0, as shown as follows:
x∗i = 1 + ri − c+ γkiE [xj|j ∈ Ni ] . (28)
Thus, we have
x(k, l) = 1 + r(k, l)− c+ γkE [x(k, l) ∣∣(k, l) ∈ D2 ] . (29)
From Eq. (21), we have
E
[
x(k′, l′)
∣∣(k′, l′) ∈ D2 ] = ∑
l′∈D
H(l′)
∑
k′∈D
P (k′)x(k′, l′)
=
∑
l′∈D
(
H(l′)
∑
k′∈D
(
P (k′)
(
1 + r(k′, l′)− c+ γk′E [x(k′′, l′′) ∣∣(k′′, l′′) ∈ D2 ])))
= 1 + r − c+ γkE [x(k′′, l′′) ∣∣(k′′, l′′) ∈ D2 ] , (30)
where r =
∑
l∈D
H(l)
∑
k∈D
P (k)r(k, l) and k =
∑
l∈D
H(l)
∑
k∈D
P (k)k =
∑
k∈D
P (k)k. Since we also
have
E
[
x(k′, l′)
∣∣(k′, l′) ∈ D2 ] = E [x(k′′, l′′) ∣∣(k′′, l′′) ∈ D2 ] , (31)
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it can be concluded from Eq. (30) with the following expression
Avg(x−i) = E [xj |j ∈ Ni ] = 1 + r − c
1− γk . (32)
Therefore, we obtain the closed-form expression of the participation level of the MU with type
(k, l) in the Bayesian follower game, which is given as follows:
x∗(k, l) = 1 + r(k, l)− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk . (33)
Note that Algorithm 1 can be implemented similarly in incomplete information scenario. The
only difference is that the best-response function update policy in the 4th line of Algorithm 1 is
replaced by another update policy obtained from Eq. (19). Since we have validated the existence
and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the modified Algorithm 1 can achieve the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium [49]. Similar to that in complete information scenario, this Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is also the approximate equilibrium due to the error .
2) Leader game: As the CSP has the information on the degree distributions of MUs but has
no information on MUs’ type, and thus can offer only a uniform reward4, i.e., r(k, l) = r for
all MUs. The optimal incentive mechanism obtained from the leader game is characterized by
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The optimal reward offered by the CSP in the Bayesian Stackelberg game is unique,
which is given as follows:
r∗ = c− 1 + (µs+ 1− c)
(
1− γk)
2
(
1− γk + µt+ µtγ2σk2
) . (34)
Proof. Please refer to the appendix for the details.
Furthermore, we study the benchmark case where the CSP knows both the in-degree and
out-degree of any individual follower. In such a situation, the CSP is able to offer discriminatory
reward as incentive, r(k, l) for the MU with out-degree k and in-degree l. Then, the revenue
maximization problem faced by the CSP is characterized in the following theorem.
4Note that the uniform incentive mechanism is more applicable in incomplete information scenario, where the CSP has no
information on the specific type of each individual MU. However, the in/out-degree distributions of MUs can be obtained
through, e.g., historical information or long-term learning, which makes the uniform incentive mechanism feasible. This can
also be confirmed by the closed-form solution for the optimal uniform reward, since the expression of the optimal reward only
includes the mean and variance of the in/out-degree distributions instead of the type of individual MU.
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Figure 2: The impact of total number of MUs
on the crowdsensing service provider and mo-
bile participants.
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Figure 3: The impact of average value of social
network effects on the crowdsensing service
provider and mobile participants.
Theorem 4. Provided that the CSP clearly knows the type of each individual MU, the optimal
discriminatory reward r(k, l) offered to the MU with out-degree k and in-degree l, is unique.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix for the details.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed socially-aware incentive mecha-
nisms of the CSP in crowdsensing applications, and investigate the impacts of different param-
eters of mobile networks on the performance.
A. Investigation on Stackelberg game with complete information on social structure
We consider a group of N MUs, i.e., mobile participants, in a social network and set the
parameters as follows. We assume the intrinsic parameters of MUs, i.e., ai and bi follow the
normal distribution N (µa, 2) and N (µb, 2). In addition, the social tie gij between any two users i
and j follows a normal distribution N (µg, 1). The default parameters are set as: c = 15, µ = 0.1,
s = 20, t = 0.05, µa = µb = 15, µg = 0.05 and N = 50. Note that some of these parameters
are varied according to the evaluation scenarios. As expected and verified in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3,
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the discriminatory incentive yields the larger revenue for the CSP, compared with the uniform
incentive. Intuitively, the reason is that the CSP can adjust the reward according to individual
MU’s effort and contribution, which is proven by Fig. 4.
We next evaluate the impact of the total number of MUs on the proposed incentive mechanisms,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. As the number of MUs increases, the total utilities of participants and
the revenue of the CSP also increase under both mechanisms. The reason is that when the total
number of MUs increases, the number of social neighboring MUs also increases. Owing to
the underlying social network effects, the MUs are motivated by their social neighbours to have
higher participation levels, and the revenue of the CSP is improved accordingly. In addition, with
the increase of total number of participants, the total offered reward increases since the CSP tends
to encourage more MUs to participate, in order to attain a greater revenue gain. In particular,
the discriminatory and uniform incentive mechanisms enable the CSP to reduce the reward paid
to the MUs, i.e., the cost, and therefore achieve a greater revenue gain in turn. Figure 3 depicts
the impact of average value of social network effects on two entities of this network, i.e., the
CSP and MUs. We observe that as the social network effects becomes stronger, the total utilities
of participants and the revenue of the CSP also increase. Since when the strength of social tie
is stronger, the additional benefits obtained from social network effects are greater. In other
words, the socially-aware MUs are motivated by each other and have higher participation levels
consequently. When the participation levels are high enough, the CSP is able to offer less reward
to save money. In turn, the total utilities of participants and the revenue of the CSP are improved.
Furthermore, we observe that the total offered reward under the uniform incentive mechanism
and the discriminatory incentive mechanism have no big difference from both Figs. 2 and 3.
The reason is that the CSP under the discriminatory incentive mechanism is able to achieve a
balanced reward allocation with the similar cost. For example, the CSP can offer more reward
to some MUs and less reward to some other MUs, which leads to a greater overall participation
level. This intuition is demonstrated in Fig. 4. From the third sub-figure in Fig. 3, we find that
the uniform reward curve has several fluctuations suffering from the randomness of the social tie
gij when network effects become stronger. Nevertheless, we can observe that the uniform reward
still remains largely unchanged (around 50). This is different from the third sub-figure in Fig. 2,
where we cannot observe the fluctuations. The reason is that Fig. 2 illustrates the impacts of
the number of MUs on total offered reward from the CSP. Intuitively, the total reward increases
when the number of participants increases. Thus, the slight fluctuations cannot be observed in
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Figure 4: A case illustration of distribution of normalized reward and participation level.
Fig. 2 since the reward keeps increasing.
Then, to explore the impacts of social network effects on each specific participant, we inves-
tigate the optimal reward and resulting MUs’ participation level with the number of 50 MUs,
and we adopt the similar default parameters setting to that in above discussions. The adjacency
matrix G is generated as follows:
gi,i+1 = 0.2×
(
0.5− (0.5− i−1
N
)2)
, i ∈ [1, N − 1];
gi+1,i = 0.2×
(
0.5− (0.5− i−1
N
)2)
, i ∈ [1, N − 1];
gi,j = 0, otherwise.
(35)
From Eq. (35), only participants who are adjacent in participant indexes (neighbours) can
affect each other. From Fig. 4, we observe that the CSP offers each participant the same reward
when it has no information about the value of matrix G. Given the reward from the CSP, the
MUs have different participation level equilibrium as shown in Fig. 4, where we observe that
the participation levels of the MUs are socially related to each other. In particular, the 27th MU
is the most susceptible or influenced one in this network because it has the highest participation
level given the same reward. On the contrary, the 1st and the 51st MUs are the most influential
ones. Therefore, with the knowledge about the value of matrix G, the CSP is likely to offer
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more reward to the 1st and the 51st MUs and less to the 27th MU, under the discriminatory
incentive mechanism. The reason is that the CSP tends to have the highest participation level
from the participant with the lowest cost and thus have a greater revenue gain. However, under
the uniform incentive mechanism, the CSP can offer only the same reward to the participants.
As such, the CSP usually offers more reward and promotes the participants to attain higher
participation level, but the incurred extra cost is also very high, which decreases the revenue of
the CSP consequently.
B. Investigation on Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information on social structure
Similar to the above discussions, we consider a group of N MUs. The in-degree and out-degree
of MUs follow the normal distribution N (k, σ2k) and N (k, σ2l ), respectively. The parameters are
set as follows: γ = 0.01, k = 20, σ2k = σ
2
l = 10, µ = 10, s = 20, t = 0.05, c = 15, and
N = 100.
We first study the optimal offered reward in terms of different in-degrees and out-degrees,
as illustrated in Fig. 5. Interestingly, we find that the optimal offered reward increases with the
increase of in-degree, and increases with the decrease of out-degree. Recall that the MU’s in-
degree represents its influence and the out-degree represents its susceptibility. As the in-degree
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Figure 7: The impacts of variance of the distribution of in/out-degree.
of the MU increases, this MU can encourage more other MUs due to the underlying social
network effects. In a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing platform, we can treat
the drivers in critical central paths as the MUs with higher in-degree, i.e., greater influence. The
road information from these drivers plays a great role, i.e., the participation of these drivers can
greatly promote the participation of others. Thus, in the presence of social network effects, the
CSP tends to offer more reward to the MUs with the higher in-degree, since they potentially
motivate more participation level of other MUs. On the contrary, for the MUs with the higher
out-degree, the CSP has no incentive to offer more reward. The reason is that the MUs with
the higher out-degree are more susceptible, and these MUs are potentially positively affected by
others. Consequently, the CSP is able to offer less reward to save the cost.
Furthermore, we investigate the impacts of mean value of social network effects on the players
of Bayesian Stackelberg game in Fig. 6. As expected, we observe that the optimal offered reward
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decreases when the mean value of social network effects increases. The reason is that as the
mean value of social network effects become stronger, the MUs can motivate each other to have
higher participation level due to the interdependent participation behaviors. The total utilities of
MUs become greater, and thus the CSP tends to offer less reward to save the cost. Consequently,
the CSP achieves the greater revenue gain. In addition, comparing different curves with different
value of µ, we find that when µ, i.e., the equivalent monetary worth of MUs’ participation
level increases, the CSP tends to offer more reward as the participation incentive. The reason is
that the CSP is more inclined to arouse the enthusiasms of MUs when the CSP can transform
the participation level of MUs to more monetary revenue efficiently. Therefore, to extract more
surplus from MUs, the CSP offers more reward and thus achieves a greater revenue gain.
Figure 7 illustrates the impacts of variance of the distribution of social network effects on
the players of Bayesian Stackelberg game. As the variance of social network effects decreases,
the achieved revenue under uniform incentive mechanism is close to that under discriminatory
incentive mechanism. The reason is that the heterogeneity of MUs is reduced when the value of
variance decreases. We may consider an extreme case when the value of variance is zero, i.e., the
MUs are homogeneous, the discriminatory incentive mechanism yields the same results as those
of the uniform incentive mechanism. On the contrary, when the value of variance increases, the
achieved revenue under the discriminatory incentive mechanism increases. The reason is that
discriminatory incentive mechanism enables the CSP to exploit the different preference, i.e.,
parameters of utility function, for each of MUs, which leads to the decrease of total utilities of
MUs and the increases of the revenue. Moreover, when the participation cost of MUs increases,
the utility of MUs from participation is discounted. As such, the CSP tends to offer more reward
to compensate the participation cost for improving their motivation. Meanwhile, the total utilities
of MUs still decrease due to the increasing participation cost. Similarly, the revenue of the CSP
decreases.
Lastly, both Figs. 6 and 7 demonstrate the fact that the discriminatory incentive mechanism
performs better in terms of the achieved revenue compared with uniform incentive mechanism.
The intuition is that, with the certain social structure information, the CSP can set different reward
for different MUs, as verified by the Fig. 5. As such, the CSP can significantly encourage the
greater participation level of MUs. In particular, the social structure information guides the CSP
to extract more surplus from the MUs’ participation, which results in the greater revenue gain.
In summary, we draw the following engineering insights:
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• The network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level, which leads
to the greater total utilities of MUs as well as the greater revenue of the CSP.
• The discriminatory incentive mechanism yields the greater revenue of the CSP compared
with the uniform incentive mechanism in both complete and incomplete information sce-
narios.
• The achieved revenue gap between the uniform and discriminatory incentive mechanisms
depends on the variance of network effects.
• The CSP has the incentive to offer more reward to the influential MUs and less reward to
the susceptible MUs, in order to promote a greater overall participation level.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have developed a two-stage Stackelberg game theoretic model, and obtained
the equilibrium using backward induction. The Crowdsensing Service Provider (CSP) determines
the incentive in the first stage, and the Mobile Users (MUs) decide on their participation level in
response to the observed incentive in the second stage. Taking the social (local) network effects
among MUs into account, we have proposed two incentive mechanisms, i.e., discriminatory
incentive and uniform incentive, where we have obtained the closed-form expression for optimal
incentive. Moreover, we have formulated the Bayesian Stackelberg game to analyze the incentive
mechanism, when the social network effects are uncertain. We have validated the existence and
uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium by identifying the best response strategies of
MUs. Performance evaluations have demonstrated that the network effects significantly improve
the participation levels of MUs and the revenue of the CSP. Additionally, it has been confirmed
that the social structure information helps the CSP to achieve greater revenue gain. The joint
considerations of uncertainties of internal utility and social influence in the model are well worth
studying in the future works.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof. Similar to that in Section IV, we first apply the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
follower game given in Eq. (33) into the objective function given in Eq. (23). Since r(k, l) = r
for all MUs under the uniform incentive mechanism, we know that the unique participation level
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of the MU only depends on its out-degree k from Eq. (33), i.e., x∗(k, l) = x∗(k). The expected
revenue of the CSP given in (23) is then expressed as follows:
Π =
∑
k∈D
P (k)
(
(µs− r)x∗(k)− µt(x∗(k))2). (36)
In particular, we have the following mathematical transformations,
Π = (µs− r)
(
1 + r − c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)
− µt
∑
k∈D
P (k)
(
1 + r − c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
= (µs− r) 1 + r − c
1− γk − µt (1 + r − c)
2 − 2µt (1 + r − c) γk1 + r − c
1− γk
−µt
∑
k∈D
P (k)k2
(
γ
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
= (µs− r) 1 + r − c
1− γk − µt (1 + r − c)
2 − 2µt (1 + r − c) γk1 + r − c
1− γk
−µt
(
k
2
+ σk
2
)(
γ
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
= (µs− r) 1 + r − c
1− γk − µtγ
2σk
2
(
γ
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
−
(
µt (1 + r − c)2
+2µt (1 + r − c) γk1 + r − c
1− γk + µtk
2
(
γ
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2)
= (µs− r) 1 + r − c
1− γk − µtγ
2σk
2
(
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
− µt
(
1 + r − c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
= (µs− r) 1 + r − c
1− γk − µtγ
2σk
2
(
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
− µt
(
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
= (µs+ 1− c− (1 + r − c)) 1 + r − c
1− γk − µtγ
2σk
2
(
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
− µt
(
1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
= (µs+ 1− c) 1 + r − c
1− γk −
(
1− γk + µt+ µtγ2σk2
)(1 + r − c
1− γk
)2
. (37)
Then, we evaluate its first-order optimality condition with respect to the reward, and we have
∂Π
∂r
= ∂Π
∂ 1+r−c
1−γk
∂ 1+r−c
1−γk
∂r
, which yields(
(µs+ 1− c)− 2 (1− γk + µt+ µtγ2σk2)(1 + r∗ − c
1− γk
))
1
1− γk = 0. (38)
Thus, we can conclude that
1 + r∗ − c = (µs+ 1− c)
(
1− γk)
2
(
1− γk + µt+ µtγ2σk2
) . (39)
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Therefore, the optimal uniform reward under Bayesian formulation is uniquely determined, which
is given as follows:
r∗ = c− 1 + (µs+ 1− c)
(
1− γk)
2
(
1− γk + µt+ µtγ2σk2
) . (40)
B. Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. The CSP determines r(k, l) for the MU with out-degree k and in-degree l to maximize
its expected revenue. The derivation of the optimal reward follows the similar steps discussed
in Section IV. We have the expected revenue of the CSP, which is expressed as follows:
Π =
∑
l∈D
(∑
k∈D
H(l)P (k)
(
(µs− r(k, l))
(
1 + r(k, l)− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)
−
µt
(
1 + r(k, l)− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)2))
. (41)
By taking the first derivative with respect to r with any out-degree m ∈ D and in-degree n ∈ D,
we have
∂Π
∂r(m,n)
=
∂
∂r(m,n)
H(n)P (m)
(
(µs− r(m,n))
(
1 + r(m,n)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
)
− µt
(
1 + r(m,n)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
)2)
+
∂
∂r(m,n)
∑
l 6=n
∑
k 6=m
H(l)P (k)
×
(
(µs− r(k, l))
(
1 + r(k, l)− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)
− µt
(
1 + r(k, l)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
)2)
. (42)
Accordingly, we know
∂Π
∂r(m,n)
= H(n)P (m)
(
−
(
1 + r(m,n)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
)
+
(
1 + γm
H(n)P (m)
1− γk
)
× (µs− r(m,n))− 2µt
(
1 + r(m,n)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
)(
1 + γm
H(n)P (m)
1− γk
))
+
∂
∂r(m,n)
∑
k 6=m
∑
l 6=n
H(l)P (k)
(
(µs− r(k, l)) γkH(n)P (m)
1− γk
− 2µtγkH(n)P (m)
1− γk
(
1 + r(k, l)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
))
. (43)
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Since we know ∂Π
∂r(m,n)
= 0, we conclude that
0 = H(n)P (m)
(
−
(
1 + r(m,n)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
)
+ µs− r(m,n)
−2µt
(
1 + r(m,n)− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
))
+ γ
H(n)P (m)
1− γk
∑
l∈D
∑
k∈D
H(l)P (k)k
×
(
µs− r(k, l)− 2µt
(
1 + r(k, l)− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
))
. (44)
With simple steps, we obtain the following expression
r∗(m,n) =
1
2(1 + µt)
(
c− 1− γm1 + r − c
1− γk + µs− 2µt
(
1− c+ γm1 + r − c
1− γk
)
+
γn
1− γk
(
µs− 2µt (1− c)−
2µtγ (1 + r − c)
(
σk
2 + k
2
)
(1− γk)k
)
− γn1 + 2µt
1− γk ψ
)
,
(45)
where
ψ =
∑
l∈D
∑
k∈D
1
k
kH(l)P (k)r(k, l). (46)
Moreover, based on the definition of r, we have
r =
∑
m∈D
∑
n∈D
H(n)P (m)r(m,n)
=
1
2(1 + µt)
(
c− 1− γk1 + r − c
1− γk + µs− 2µt
(
1− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)
+
γk
1− γk
×
(
µs− 2µt (1− c)−
2µtγ (1 + r − c)
(
σk
2 + k
2
)
(1− γk)k
)
− γk1 + 2µt
1− γk ψ
)
. (47)
Thus, we have
r =
1
2(1 + µt)
(
−
(
1− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)(
2µt
1− γk + 1
)
+
µs
1− γk
− 2µtγ
2σk
2 (1 + r − c)(
1− γk)2
(
1− c+ γk1 + r − c
1− γk
)
− γk1 + 2µt
1− γk ψ
)
. (48)
Likewise, based on the definition of ψ given in Eq. (46), we know
ψ =
∑
l∈D
∑
k∈D
1
k
kH(l)P (k)r(k, l). (49)
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Thus, we have
ψ =
1
2(1 + µt)k¯
(
− k (1− c)−
γ (1 + r − c)
(
σk
2 + k
2
)
1− γk + µsk − 2µt
(
(1− c) k
+
γ (1 + r¯ − c) (σk2 + k¯2)
1− γk¯ ) +
γk¯2
1− γk¯ (µs−
2µtγ (1 + r¯ − c) (σk2 + k¯2)
(1− γk¯)k¯
−2µt (1− c)
)
− γk2 1 + 2µt
1− γk ψ
)
=
1
2(1 + µt)
(
c− 1−
γk (1 + r − c)
(
σk
2 + k
2
)
1− γk + µs− 2µt
(
1− c+ γk (1 + r − c)
1− γk
)
+
γk
1− γk
(
µs− 2µt
(
(1− c) + γk (1 + r − c)
1− γk
)
− 2µtγ (1 + r − c)σk
2
(1− γk)k
)
−γσk
2 (1 + r − c)
(1− γk)k −
2µtγσk
2 (1 + r − c)
(1− γk)k − γk
1 + 2µt
1− γk ψ
)
=
1
2(1 + µt)
(
−
(
1− c+ γk (1 + r − c)
1− γk
)(
1 +
2µt
1− γk
)
+
µs
1− γk
−γσk
2 (1 + r − c)
(1− γk)k
(
1 +
2µt
1− γk
)
− γk1 + 2µt
1− γk ψ
)
. (50)
The two expressions given in Eq. (48) and Eq. (50) together formulate a full rank linear
equation system with two variables, i.e., r and ψ. Thus, we can derive the closed-form expression
for both r and ψ [50]. In particular, the closed-form expression for the variable r is obtained as
r = ρ−1
γk
2(1 + µt)− γk
(
−
(
1− c+ γk (1− c)
1− γk
)(
1 +
2µt
1− γk
)
+
µs
γk
)
− µtγ
2σk
2 (1− c)
(1− γk)2(1 + µt)
+
(1 + 2µt)γ2σk
2 (1− c)
2
(
2 + 2µt− γk) (1− γk)(1 + µt)
(
1 +
2µt
γk
)
, (51)
where
ρ = 1 +
γk
2(1 + µt)− γk
(
1 +
2µt
1− γk
)
+
µtγ2σk
2 (1 + r − c)
(1− γk)2(1 + µt)
− (1 + 2µt)γ
2σk
2
2
(
2 + 2µt− γk) (1− γk)(1 + µt)
(
1 +
2µt
γk
)
. (52)
Likewise, the closed-form expression for the variable ψ can be derived through similar steps.
Accordingly, r(m,n) can be obtained after plugging these two closed-form expressions into
Eq. (45), and thus the solution of r(m,n) is unique. The proof is then completed.
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C. Discussions on asymmetric social influence:
It is noted that our proposed approach is not restricted to the symmetry assumption that gij =
gji. We will illustrate the model with asymmetric social influence in the complete information
and incomplete information scenarios, respectively.
1) Complete Information on Social Structure:
First, we will show how our approach can be extended to the model with asymmetric social
influence in complete information scenario.
We first check whether Lemma 1 still holds when gij 6= gji. In Lemma 1, we proved B−G is
invertible by proving it is a positive definite matrix, and evidently the positive definite matrix is
symmetric. Nevertheless, we find that B−G is strictly diagonally dominant even when gij = gji
does not hold. According to LevyDesplanques theorem [51], a strictly diagonally dominant matrix
is non-singular. Thus, B−G is still invertible. Therefore, without the symmetry assumption of
gij , the Lemma 1 still holds.
Recall that K = (B−G)−1 is symmetric, since we have gij = gji. Thus, K> + K can be
simplified as 2K. However, when gij 6= gji, K = (B−G)−1 is not symmetric, and K> + K
cannot be simplified, which will complicate our mathematical calculation process. Nevertheless,
the analytical solution for the profit maximization of the CSP is still structurally the same as
that in Section IV-B.
For the discriminatory incentive mechanism: When gij 6= gji, the objective function of the
CSP and the optimal value of x∗ keep unchanged. By plugging x into the objective function of
the CSP, we have
Π = µ
(
s1>K (a+ r− c1)− t(a+ r− c1)>K2 (a+ r− c1)
)
− r>K (a+ r− c1) . (53)
We next take the partial derivative of the objective function of the CSP with respect to the
decision vector r to zero, i.e., ∂Π
∂r
= 0, we have
∂Π
∂r
= µ
(
sK1− t
(
K2 +
(
K2
)>)
(a+ r− c1)
)
−K (a+ r− c1)−Kr = 0. (54)
Then, we have
µ
(
sK1− t(K2 + (K2)>) (a− c1)
)
−K (a− c1) =
(
2K+ µt(K2 + (K2)
>
)
)
r. (55)
We obtain the optimal value r∗, which is represented as follows:
r∗ =
(
2K+ µt(K2 + (K2)
>
)
)−1 (
µ
(
sK1− t(K2 + (K2)>) (a− c1)
)
−K (a− c1)
)
. (56)
32
For uniform incentive mechanism, x = K [a+ (r − c)1]. We obtain
Π = µ
(
s1>K (a+ r1)− t(a+ r1)>K2 (a+ r1)
)
− r1>K (a+ r1) . (57)
Then, we evaluate its first-order optimality condition with respect to the reward r, which yields
∂Π
∂r
= µ
(
s1>K1− 2t(a+ r1)>K21
)
− 1>K (a+ r1)− r1>K1 = 0. (58)
As a result, with simple steps, we obtain the optimal value of the uniform reward, which is
represented by
r∗ =
(
µt1>
(
K2 +K2
>
)
+ 21>K1
)−1 (
µ
(
s1>K1− t(a− c1)>
(
K2 +K2
>
)
1
)
− 1>K (a− c1)
)
.
(59)
2) Incomplete Information on Social Structure: In incomplete information scenario, the pro-
posed solution is also not restricted to such symmetry assumption that gij = gji. In other
words, social ties are not reciprocal under our consideration in incomplete information scenario.
Instead, we consider that the adjacency matrix G leads to different in-degrees and out-degrees
of MUs. The in-degree denotes the number of other MUs that a certain MU influences, the out-
degree denotes the number of other MUs influencing this MU. Thus, the in-degree represents
its influence and the out-degree represents its susceptibility. The distribution of in-degree and
out-degree captures the social network effects from the network interaction patterns. Recall that
since we consider both the in-degree and out-degree distributions of each MU instead of the
degree distribution, the proposed model can still be applied to the asymmetric social ties. For
example, an MU Alice has the social influence on another MU, but the latter may not have the
social influence on Alice. The reason is that Alice may have different in-degree and out-degree.
D. Discussion on cost function:
Note that our model can be straightforwardly extended to a more generalized heterogenous
unit cost and nonlinear cost function here, and we now show an example when the cost function
becomes cixi2. We choose this function since it can represent the condition that the incurred
cost increases when the MU keeps increasing its participation level, and the marginal increase
is increasing (instead of keeping unchanged for linear cost unction).
In the following, we illustrate how our approach can be applied to the model with heterogenous
non-linear cost function in the complete information and incomplete information scenarios,
respectively.
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1) Complete Information on Social Structure: Firstly, the utility of MU i is reformulated as
follows:
ui(xi,x−i, r) = aixi − bixi2 +
N∑
j=1
gijxixj + rixi − cixi2. (60)
The best response of MU i becomes:
x∗i = max
{
0,
ri + ai
2bi + 2ci
+
N∑
j=1
gij
2bi + 2ci
xj
}
,∀i. (61)
Then, we make an assumption for sufficient condition similar to that in Assumption 1, i.e.,
Assumption R1:
N∑
j=1
gij
2bi+ci
< 1,∀i. Under such assumption, the MU has the upper bound on
participation level, e.g., due to the battery capacity of a mobile device, and thus this assumption
is reasonable. Provided that Assumption R1 holds, the existence and uniqueness of Nash equi-
librium in MU participation game can still be proved in the way that is structurally the same as
the proof of Theorem 1.
Next we can obtain the closed-form solution for the unique Nash equilibrium, which is written
in matrix form as follows:
x = K′ (a+ r) , (62)
where K′ := (B+C−G)−1, C := diag(2c1, 2c2, . . . , 2cN), B := diag(2b1, 2b2, . . . , 2bN) and
G := [gij]N×N .
Under Assumption R1, we can prove B+C−G is invertible similar to the proof in Lemma 1.
Next, we show how the incentive mechanism with heterogenous non-linear cost function is
derived.
First, for the discriminatory incentive mechanism, the CSP’s revenue is formulated as follows:
Π = µ
(
s1>K′ (a+ r)− t(a+ r)>K′2 (a+ r)
)
− r>K′ (a+ r) . (63)
Taking the partial derivative of the above objective function with respect to the decision vector
r to zero, we have
∂Π
∂r
= µ
(
sK′1− 2tK′2 (a+ r− c1)
)
−K′ (a+ r− c1)−K′r = 0. (64)
Then, we have
µ
(
sK′1− 2tK′2a
)
−K′a =
(
2K′ + 2µtK′2
)
r. (65)
Finally, we obtain the optimal value of r∗, which is represented as follows:
r∗ = (2I+ 2µtK′)−1 (µ (s1− 2tK′a)− a) . (66)
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Likewise, for uniform incentive mechanism, we have
Π = µ
(
s1>K′ (a+ r1)− t(a+ r1)>K′2 (a+ r1)
)
− r1>K′ (a+ r1) . (67)
Then, we evaluate its first-order optimality condition with respect to the uniform reward r, which
yields
∂Π
∂r
= µ
(
s1>K′1− 2t(a+ r1)>K′21
)
− 1>K′ (a+ r1)− r1>K′1 = 0. (68)
As a result, with simple steps, we can obtain the optimal value of the uniform reward, which is
represented by
r∗ =
(
2µt1>K′21+ 21>K′1
)−1 (
µ
(
s1>K′1− 2ta>K′21
)
− 1>K′a
)
. (69)
2) Incomplete Information on Social Structure: Recall that the expected utility of MU i in
incomplete information scenario is reformulated as follows:
Ui(xi,x−i, r) = E [ui(xi,x−i, r)] = xi − 1
2
xi
2 + γxiE
[∑
j∈Ni
xj
]
+ rixi − cixi2. (70)
With the same deduction shown in Section V-A, the expected utility can be expressed as
follows:
Ui(xi,x−i, r, ki) = (1 + ri)xi − (1
2
+ ci)xi
2 + γkixiAvg(x−i), (71)
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we also have
∂Ui(x¯,x−i, r, ki)
∂xi
= (1 + ri)− cix¯− x¯+ γkiAvg(x−i)
≤ (1 + ri)− cix¯− x¯+ γkmaxx¯
= 1 + ri + (γk
max − 1− ci)x¯. (72)
Since we have the condition γkmax < 1, we know that γkmax − ci < 1 holds evidently. Thus,
we can still guarantee the existence of the Bayesian follower game. Moreover, it still holds that∣∣∣∂2Ui(x¯,x−i,r,ki)∂xi∂Avg(x−i) /∂2Ui(x¯,x−i,r,ki)∂xi∂xi ∣∣∣ = |γki| ≤ |γkmax|. Thus, the uniqueness of the Bayesian follower
game is guaranteed even if we change the cost function of MUs. Based on the unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, the CSP can still achieve the profit maximization through backward induction.
The corresponding proof steps are structurally the same as the proof of Theorems 3 and 4 with
the uniform cost.
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